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INFLUENCING WELFARE/WARFARE PRIORITIES
THROUGH THE NEW BUDGETARY PROCESS
Ann Blalock
In the previous article, Weinert challenged social workers, and other profes-
sionals in the area of social welfare, to commit themselves to greater collective
political action in the interest of substantial social change. He suggested that
there are many options for movement in that direction. This article briefly dis-
cusses one incremental option within the established political system, intervention
within the new Congressional budgetary process. This is not an insignificant
strategy. Its purpose is to influence the way the national budget is constructed.
The budget incorporates to an important degree the society's prevailing definition
of its priorities. Furthermore, future policy alternatives are vitally affected
by budget decisions, as mandated budget authority strongly restricts future social
policy alternatives.
Therefore, an understanding of the meaning of the new Congressional Budget Act
and some of the problems in its implementation is critical to developing an effec-
tive strategy for impacting that process. The Act offers a significant opportunity
to individual citizens and organized groups to change the direction of national
priorities, among them welfare and warfare. It provides a relatively fixed time
schedule around which collective action can be organized, and it identifies the
individuals and committees necessary to approach. A strategy built around this
process is appropriate to the social work profession. Many social welfare profes-
sionals are excellently qualified to perform the policy analysis tasks and to con-
struct the crucial political coalitions which support this kind of intervention.
Social workers' knowledge of domestic needs, and of the strengths and weaknesses
of existing social service delivery systems, place them in a privileged position
to utilize the innovations provided in the new Act. Moreover, the implications of
their mobilizing around the budgetary cycle can extend well beyond the territory of
the federal budget itself.
Background of the New Budgetary Process
The federal government is the most significant financier for the military and
welfare sectors of the society. It is estimated that in fiscal '78 federal defense
allocations will be approximately 130-150 billion, and social welfare expenditures
approximately 190-240 billion.1 Responsibility for the research, planning, and
management of such enormous federal outlays is constitutionally shared among the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. The Constitution pro-
poses a set of initiatives and constraints within this responsibility, to be trans-
lated into national administrative law. However, the actual relationship among
these branches has been uneven, and the budgetary process less than open.
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The search for more effective budgetary methods in Congress was stimulated in
contemporary history by controversy over national priorities, including warfare/
welfare, and by the impoundment of funds. It was an undeniable legacy of Watergate
However, there has been a perennial consciousness that Congressional budget reform
was critically needed. Much has changed in the two centuries of American govern-
mental existence, but the formal division of responsibilities has remained intact.
Money expenditure was to be a two-stage process: first the Congress would appro-
priate funds, and only afterwards would the executive spend them. Not only was
Congress to decide how much would be spent, but more importantly for what purposes
The demands of this essential role of Congress were admittedly not being met
by past policies or methods. As long as the federal budget was small, it was ra-
tional for Congress to control expenditures by means of line item appropriations,
and restrictions on the shifting of funds among categories. But the tremendous
growth of the federal budget has required a broadening of the units of appropria-
tions and more transfer flexibility.3 As the federal budget increased in size and
importance, a growing inequity in influence evolved between the executive and the
legislative branch.
The formulation of the President's budget recommendations employed the ana-
lytic expertise of a large and powerful budget staff with vast informational
sources, a resource particularly exploited during the Watergate period to enhance
executive authority.4  The effect was disadvantaged Congressional competition with
the executive. Over-burdened staffs of individual committees were forced to rely
primarily on executive agencies for information. Whereas the President had an
eighteen month period to develop a budget, Congress was required to compress cru-
cial budget decisions into a few months, and often became dependent on continuing
resolutions as a means of funding federal agencies and programs. As program and
financial policy-making became more concentrated in the executive, the budgetary
process grew more fragmented in the Congress. The inevitable consequence was a
serious imbalance of power. This became translated into welfare/warfare terms
because Presidential budgets tended to emphasize a heavy commitment to the militarl
which Congress was unwilling or unable to challenge.
Therefore, a severe erosion occurred in Congressional capability for assessin
program priorities effectively, and in establishing overall budget policy. Congres!
was clearly not able to decide among competing claims on the budget in a compre-
hensive manner. The basic assumption in the growing movement for budget reform
was that the federal budget had in actuality become the primary tool for determin-
ing governmental goals, and was progressively passing beyond Congressional control
Not simply its growth, but more so the directions it would take, were at stake.
The augmentation in the portion of the budget which was relatively "uncontrollable
under existing law, magnified the significance of the issue.5 It was becoming in-
creasingly more difficult to deal with carryover balances where appropriations,
outlays, and budget authority failed to mesh.6
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The search for improved budgetary methods ultimately settled within the Joint
Study Committee on Budget Control. Out of months of deliberation over alternatives,
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 surfaced into law.
The Act radically modified the Congressional budget process, and provided controls
over the presidential impoundment of funds. It established new Budget Committees
in the House and Senate, responsible for setting federal budget priorities, and
created a new Congressional Budget Office. The primary intent of the legislation
was to re-establish Congressional power over the federal budget. The outcome has
been to provide new citizen access to the policy analysis and decision-making
process, and to introduce greater transfer possibilities into revenue allocations.
The Content of the New Process
The new budget process requires an unprecedented effort simply in meeting the
series of negotiation deadlines in the mandated timetable for decision-making, be-
ginning October first and ending the following September 30th, a timetable which
essentially constitutes a stringent set of policy guidelines. The public visibility
of this timetable allows for its strategic use. The process requires the following
steps: 1) prior to the regular Presidential budget presentation, the President
must provide a budget which projects expected outlays in the upcoming fiscal year,
assuming all programs are to be carried on at the same levels without policy
changes; 2) the first concurrent resolution of the Congress then makes explicit
the specific levels of budget outlays and new budget authority, both in total and
for each of sixteen major functional expenditure categories. This involves the
amount of any deficit or surplus, the recommended levels of federal revenues, and
the public debt ceilings. When finally negotiated and passed, this resolution
sets the overall budgetary parameters for the Budget Committees; 3) the Committees
are then to work toward completing action on bills that provide new budget authority
and spending authority; and 4) the second concurrent resolution reaffirms or re-
vises the first concurrent resolution, and any differences between the House and
Senate must be reconciled by the end of September. 7 Thus the new Act has presented
challenges to historic positions, and compelled the Congress to make distinctive
policy decisions.
The most profound role defined for the new Congressional Budget Office in the
Act was the development of an annual report that not merely identified alternative
levels of spending, revenues, and tax expenditures, but discussed national budget
priorities, including "alternative ways of allocating budget authority and budget
outlays for the fiscal year among major programs or functional categories, taking
into account how such alternative allocations will meet major national needs and
affect balanced growth and development in the U.S.'8 As with the Brookings analyses,
the report was to speak to objectives, priorities, and alternative choices, but not
to specify preferred alternatives among the feasible options. 9
Successful implementation of this commitment of the Congress to accrue greater
power over the federal budget was considered related to the pragmatic requirement
that Congress install what Walter Williams has termed a "new institutional process"
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that would significantly alter the previous balance of power in governmental
decision-making, and assemble the high level staff needed to make expert informa-
tion and analyses an integral part of this process. 10 The new CBO was viewed by
political policy analysts as an essential tool in making this substantial shift
in Congressional life style, in particular its anticipated role in information
analysis in the service of setting national budgetary priorities. 11 Crucial to
its success, they predicted, was a staff comparable to that of the executive
branch in size and substantive diversity, in professional competence and wisdom,
in political and bureaucratic management skills, in information synthesizing and
processing technology, and in collective influence. It also had to exhibit the
capability of providing at optimum times the products of its efforts to the HousE
and Senate Budget Comirittees. The premise was that the executive branch's enjoy-
ment of superiority in the effective use of policy analysis had been the major
variable in the power inequity.
Developing such a staff proved a challenging task. But there have been an
array of other problems in implementing the Act's intended purposes, not least
among them the level of utilization of the fruits of such policy analysis by indi
vidual Congressmen, the extent of their commitment to the long-range view which
lies at the core of competent policy analysis, and the depth of their perception
of the need for analysis of non-incremental alternatives. 12 The latter is a
measure of the will of Congress to participate intelligently in what Lindblom has
called "the partisan mutual adjustment process" in a democracy.13  In the case of
federal budget decisions, this adjustment process required changing complex rela-
tionships in Congress' external organizational environment that in turn involved
intricate internal changes. Inasmuch as such basic changes contained costs to
particular Congresspersons, the pattern of history has been one of resistance to
such change.14 The primary struggle with the executive branch has therefore beer
complicated by the inevitable struggle within the Congress. The lack of clearly
specified decision-making roles for the new organizational structures within the
Congress, goal conflict and territoriality problems between "old" and "new" struc
tures, a lack of coordination and cooperation in the relationships between pre-
existing and new staffs, and differences in the methodology used for performing
essential policy analysis tasks were formidable problems anticipated to plague
full implementation of the Act. 15
The Trial Run
The nine-month "trial run" of the new budget process was completed with the
passage of a concurrent resolution in December, 1975, which established spending
limits for the remainder of fiscal 1976. This provided an opportunity to more
clearly evaluate whether Congress could actually agree on budget spending limits,
deficits, whether the Budget Committees could become part of the power hierarchy
and more importantly whether the process was capable of yielding a reasoned con-
sideration of priorities rather than simply limited debate over budget figures.
Assessment of the trial run revealed both the great potential of the Act and some
of the anticipated conflicts between the demands of the new legislation and the
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pre-existing authority structure of the Congress, "its privileges, style of opera-
tion, and staffing patterns.,,16  It therefore identified likely impediments to the
effectiveness of public strategies for influencing the budget process.
Deep differences surfaced between House and Senate perceptions of the new
budgetary process--in terms of its intent (budget control versus setting budget
priorities), and the qualifications of the CBO staff (Congressional trustworthiness
versus analytic credentials). There were differences in leadership strength, and
the nature of the internal conflicts within the new committees. 17 Though it tested
whether the new process would produce Congressional budget control, the trial run
did not really test whether the more basic purpose of the Act, general Congres-
sional budget reform had been realized. Nevertheless, the trial run was generally
considered to indicate an important positive flexibility, a capacity for learning
and modification--largely through the actions of the Budget Committees.
The CBO, as a non-partisan analytic unit serving the entire Congress, was
viewed more critically. Though the staff was considered excellently qualified,
it performed no major policy analyses during the trial run, and its economic fore-
casting, which emphasized economic stimuli to combat recession rather than eco-
nomic restraint to control inflation, had diverse results. This was not un-
related to Congressional concerns over the staff's potential power. The general
consensus, however, was that its leadership was being looked to as a major influ-
ence on future governmental economic policy. Furthermore, the CBO had developed
an analytic staff comparable in expertise (and nearly in size) to those in the
executive branch. Williams credited it with establishing "the base to do compe-
tent economic forecasting, sophisticated budget analysis and policy analysis,"
which he feels are the key parts of the process of developing more responsible
government. The net assessment was slightly more than a moderated optimism about
the outcomes of the first full budget cycle beginning October, 1975, with all the
deadlines of the timetable in force.
The First Implementation of the Full Cycle
On schedule, the House-Senate Conference Committee approved on September 10,
1976, a federal budget ceiling of approximately 413 billion for the fiscal year
beginning October first, settling on a deficit of 50.6 billion. The ceiling in
this Second Concurrent Resolution reflected only minimal differences between the
House and Senate versions. The budget compromise raised 362.5 billion in revenues
and provided 451.5 billion in new budget authority, some of which would be spent
in future years. Both Congressional versions involved essentially all the money
President Ford requested for defense, but provided for more than he requested for
jobs and other domestic programs, and rejected 10 billion in newly-proposed tax
cuts. Negotiation had successfully produced a concrete collective decision within
the timetable.
On the surface, such similar Budget Committee conclusions lacked the transpar-
ency that would reveal the truer machinations of the new budget process which
-681-
committed the Congress for the first time to a study of the aggregate effect of
all new legislation having an impact on spending. The House Budget Committee's
chairman, Brock Adams, claimed that the final Congressional budget differed
sharply from the approach favored by the White House, emphasizing programs to
fight unemployment and rejecting some of the President's initiatives in the area
of taxes and domestic programs. Not all analysts agreed with his assessment.
The balance of power had clearly been redressed to some extent. More critical,
however, in terms of the effectiveness of the first full cycle in implementing
the main intent of the Act, was to critique the extent to which the Congress had
taken responsibility for setting national priorities.
Some analysts felt that the Pentagon lobby, and the political makeup of the
Senate and House Budget Committees, interfered with this primary responsibility,
giving the balance of power to conservative Republicans and southern Democrats.
Congressional leadership was also faulted for sacrificing policy to process.
Senator Mansfield, for example, was quoted as saying "I do not intend to vote for
any amendment no matter how meritorious.. .I intend to support fully what the Budget
Committee has recommended because if we do not, then I think we might as well
abolish it, and go back to our old ways."18
The Transfer Amendment
On April 29, 1976, prior to the development of the First Concurrent Resolu-
tion, Representative Holtzman, Conyers, and Ottinger jointly proposed a transfer
amendment to the House Budget Committee's first resolution, a resolution which
had contained the largest increase for military expenditures in peacetime history--
an 11 billion increase in budget authority and 8.7 billion in outlays. The criti-
cal importareof this amendment is that it asked for a substantial shift of budget
authority and outlays from one functional category to others: from defense to
domestic programs. Such an amendment was made possible, and even desirable,
within the context of the new process. It demanded that the House Budget Committee
go beyond a concern for simple budget control, to a change in the rank order of
national preferences. It took the unequivocal position that the Committee had not
discharged its mandated obligation to provide rational alternatives to the Presi-
dent's definition of priorities, a definition Holtzman felt was tragically narrow
and unresponsive to human needs. The Holtzman amendment, and its destiny in the
Budget Committee,is illustrative both of the strength of the new Act and of the
resistances to its full implementation.
However, in proposing a transfer amendment, Representative Holtzman was
actually implementing the intent, and maximizing the flexibility, in the new
budget prQ ess: she was insisting on an official re-allocation of national
revenues.?5 Even though the amendment was rejected, its impact was catalytic.
It served as a general legislative model for future transfer amendments, both
within the Congress and among the organized public. It suggested that a very
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sophisticated understanding of the welfare/warfare tradeoff was essential, as well
as a careful preparation of the case for change in commitments among budget cate-
gories. It revealed the necessity of forming political coalitions in support of
this change. And it identified the time period in the new budgetary process which
was most significant to affect.
Several organizations and coalitions have since drafted their own transfer
amendments around the social service/defense issue, which they hope to use as one
intervention in the federal decision-making process. The Coalition for a New
Foreign and Military Policy has recently drafted a transfer amendment to the
First Budget Resolution suggesting specific cutbacks in budget authority for
defense, and a transfer of the majority of this amount to domestic programs re-
lated to economic recovery. The Friends Committee on National Legislation has
also directed energy toward using a transfer amendment as a strategy for altering
national welfare/warfare priorities.
It is time for social welfare professionals to take appropriate parallel
action. Sixteen functional policy areas within the budget are delineated within
the new Act, and political intervention with respect to the categories most re-
lated to the interests of particular groups can be productively mounted. The NASW
has recently developed a set of specific policy positions on a large number of
national priority issues. This represents an important tool in organizing a con-
certed effort to affect the political process through the budget cycle. Profes-
sionals working in the social welfare field would fail to make maximum use of this
opportunity to impact the political system if they neglected to communicate expert
opinion to relevant Congresspersons at the most critical junctures in the budgetary
timetable. To plan a rational political strategy around the timetable in fact
suggests a new approach in the profession's efforts to have a genuine influence on
social policy.
Conclusion
The federal budget in many ways mirrors our predominant value system as a
society. There is serious question as to whether that set of values has tended
toward an enlightened form of humanism or has placed a disproportionate political
value on destructive capacity. A somewhat novel opportunity has been provided by
the Act for collectively and individually communicating reasoned, well documented
policy positions to key decision-makers at vulnerable and receptive times in the
political process. These are periods in which the profession and individual citi-
zens can feel they are making some measurable impact on American social policy.
Below is the Congressional budgetary timetable for your consideration and use
as a strategy for social change. Within this framework, the most important con-
tacts will be the new House and Senate Budget Committee chairmen and committee
members, and perhaps most significantly the new Congressional Budget Office staff.
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STAGE I: CONGRESS SETS BUDGET TARGETS
November 10: President Submits Current Services Budget.
Submission of the Current Services Budget represents the initial step in the
new eleven-month budget timetable. The budget projects the cost of maintaining
current Federal programs at existing levels through the next fiscal year, adjust-
ing spending to take account of economic projections. In this way, it provides
Congress with an early look at anticipated shifts in Federal program costs re-
sulting from such factors as inflation, pay raises and changes in beneficiary
levels.
15th Day After Congress Convenes: President Submits His Budget.
The President must now include in his annual budget complete spending and
revenue projections for the next five years. He must also set forth the anti-
cipated levels of tax expenditures for this period.
March 15: Appropriations, Legislative, and Joint Committees Submit Spending and
Revenue Estimates to the Budget Committees
Each standing committee of the House and Senate, the Joint Economic Committee,
and the Joint Committees on Atomic Energy and Internal Revenue Taxation, must sub-
mit by this date its views and estimates of the aggregate spending and revenue
levels in the Congressional budget for matters within its jurisdiction. Reports
of each standing committee must also contain its estimates as to the spending
levels either authorized or provided in legislation it intends to become
effective during the next fiscal year.
April 1: Congressional Budget Office Submits Annual Report to Budget Committee
The Congressional Budget Office was established to provide the Budget Com-
mittees, and Congress, with a non-partisan source of budgetary and fiscal analysis.
Each year the CBO director is required to submit to the Budget Committees a
comprehensive report on the next fiscal year's budget. The report must include
an analysis of fiscal policy, a discussion of national budget priorities, and
alternative ways of allocating budget authority and budget outlays.
In addition to its annual report due April 1, the CBO is required to provide
the Budget Committees on a regular basis with information, data and analysis on
budget-related matters.
April 15: Budget Committees Report First Concurrent Resolution
The House and Senate Budget Committees must each report by this date a First
Concurrent Resolution on the next fiscal year's budget. The Resolution sets forth
appropriate levels of total new budget authority, total outlays, total revenues,
Federal deficit or surplus and public debt.
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The Resolution also sets appropriate levels of new budget authority and out-
lays for each of the budget's functional categories: national defense, agricul-
ture, income security, etc. (Budget authority is authority provided by law to
enter into obligations which generally result in immediate or future outlays of
governmental funds. Outlays are the actual Federal payments which result from
budget authority.)
The Committee reports accompanying the First Concurrent Resolutions must
include a tax expenditures budget which enumerates such expenditures by
functional category.
May 15: Final Day for Reporting of Legislation Authorizing New Budget Authority
It is not in order for either House to take floor action on measure author-
izing the enactment of new budget authority for the coming fiscal year unless
that measure has been reported in that House by May 15. This rule applies to
both new program legislation and legislation re-authorizing existing programs.
May 15: Congress Completes Action on First Concurrent Resolution
The May 15 deadline applies to final adoption of any House-Senate conference
report on the First Concurrent Resolution.
The joint explanatory statement ("statement of managers") accompanying a con-
ference report on a Concurrent Resolution on the Federal Budget must include an
estimated distribution of the appropriate new budget authority and outlays on the
basis of committee jurisdiction (this allocation by committee jurisdiction is
termed "crosswalking").
The Appropriations Committee in each House is required to further allocate
the new budget authority and outlay totals among its subcommittees' jurisdictions.
Other committees having jurisdiction over measures providing new budget authority
must also make allocations by subcommittee or by program. These allocations must
be reported promptly to each house.
Subsequent Concurrent Resolutions on the Budget
At any time after the First Concurrent Resolution has been agreed to, the two
Houses may revise the Resolution by adoption of a subsequent concurrent resolution
on the budget.
STAGE II: CONGRESS CONSIDERS INDIVIDUAL BUDGET MEASURES
May 15: Congress Begins Floor Action on Spending and Revenue Measures
It is not in order for either House to consider any measure providing new
budget authority for a fiscal year, new spending authority to become effective
during a fiscal year, a change in the level of revenues of public debt limit to
become effective in a fiscal year until the First Concurrent Resolution for that
fiscal year has been adopted.
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This rule does not apply to measures providing new budget authority which
first becomes available, or a change in revenues which first becomes effective,
in a fiscal year following the fiscal year to which the Concurrent Resolution
applies.
Spending authority, as defined in the Act, represents any of three kinds of
"backdoor spending"--legislation previously enacted outside the normal appropria-
tions process. These are contract, borrowing
, 
and entitlement authority.
Contract authority is the authority to enter into contracts or other obliga-
tions prior to an appropriation. Such legislation does not provide funds to
actually pay such obligations; it has required a subsequent appropriation to
liquidate them.
Borrowing authority is statutory authority that permits a Federal agency to
incur obligations and to make payments for specified purposes out of borrowed
funds.
The Budget Act "closes the backdoor" as far as both contract and borrowing
authority are concerned. (The Act places more limited restrictions on the grant-
ing of entitlement authority.) It requires that any measure providing new spend-
ing authority of these types contain a provision limiting such authority to the
amounts provided in advance by appropriations acts.
Entitlement authority is legislation that requires the payment--the budget
authority for which is not provided for in advance by appropriation acts, of
benefits to any person or government meeting the requirements established by
such law.
The Act places two restrictions on this form of backdoor spending:
--that all new entitlement authority not become effective before October 1 of
the calendar year in which the measure is reported by committee;
--that any such measure requiring new budget authority in excess of the sub-
committee and committee allocations associated with the most recent Concur-
rent Resolution must be referred to the appropriations committee of that
House. The appropriations committee is then required to report such a
measure within 15 days or be discharged from further consideration of it.
(The appropriations committee has jurisdiction to report amendments to such
measures limiting the total amount of spending authority it provides.)
*Exceptions: The above restrictions on new spending authority do not apply to
Social Security Act trust funds; trust funds where 90% or more of the receipt
represent earmarked taxes (received under specific provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954); amendments or extensions of the State and Local Fiscal
Assistance Act of 1972 (General Revenue Sharing); mixed-ownership or wholly-
owned government corporations, or where the spending consists exclusively of
proceeds from gifts to the U.S. for a specific purpose.
7th Day After Labor Day: Congress Completes Action on Spending Measures
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STAGE III: CONGRESS ESTABLISHES BUDGET LIMITS
The Second Concurrent Resolution required by the Act must either revise or
reaffirm the budgetary targets set in May.
September 15: Congress Completes Action on Second Concurrent Resolution
Reconciliation Process:
To the extent necessary, the Second Concurrent Resolution may also specify
the extent to which budget authority, spending authority, revenues, or public
debt limitations within the jurisdiction of particular committees should be
changed. In these cases, the Resolution will direct such committees to determine
and report out measures needed to accomplish such adjustments.
September 25: Congress Completes Action on Any Reconciliation Measures
Should the Second Concurrent Resolution contain a "reconciliation" provision
as described above, the committee or committees receiving such directions must
report recommendations promptly. If only one committee receives a reconciliation
direction, it reports such a measure directly to the floor. Should more than one
committee be directed to make such recommendations, these are reported to the
Budget Committee of this appropriate House, and the Budget Committee must then
report these recommendations to its House without any substantive revision.
Neither House may adjourn until action on the Second Concurrent Resolution,
together with any reconciliation measures, has been completed.
Legislation Subject to Point of Order:
Once Congress has completed action on the Second Concurrent Resolution and
any necessary reconciliation measure, it is not in order for either House to take
floor action on any measure providing new budget or spending authority, or reduc-
ing revenues, should the enactment of such measure cause the total new budget
authority or total outlay level set forth in the Second Concurrent Resolution
to be exceeded or its revenue total to be undercut. In enforcing this procedure,
budget aggregates and the projected costs of legislation shall be determined on
the basis of estimates by the Budget Committee of the appropriate House.
October 1: New Fiscal Year Begins
(The source of the entire text of the budget timetable is a recent memo from
the Senate Committee.)
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FOOTNOTES
1. The Budget of the U.S. Government: Fiscal Year 1976, (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1976).
2. See Public Law 93-334, 93rd Congress, July 12, 1974, Legislative History
section.
3. Annual increases in federal expenditures have been 15-20 billion, more than
was spent in the first century of American government.
4. The 1921 Budget and Accounting Act vested the President with the responsibility
to prepare and transmit to Congress an annual budget, in the nature of a recom-
mendation. It equipped the President with a Budget Bureau and established the
General Accounting Office.
5. The official estimate is that 75% of the budget is relatively uncontrollable,
and uncontrollables are the fastest rising part of the budget, claiming each
year a larger share of new funds. See PL 93-344, op. cit.
6. By outlays is meant how much money will be obligated in a particular year--not
how much will be spent then. By authority is meant authorization to agencies
to spend in future years.
7. P.L. 933-344, op. cit.
8. Ibid.
9. The Brookings Institution annually publishes books analyzing the federal- budget.
10. See Walter Williams, The Congressional Budget Office: A Critical Link in Budget
Reform. Public Policy Paper No. 6, Institute of Governmental Research,
(University of Washington, July 1974).
11. Ibid.
12. See Charles Schultze, The Politics and Economics of Public Spending. (The
Brookings Institution, 1968). He points out that a significant number of
policy decisions in recent years have indeed been non-incremental--i.e. have
departed sharply from past practice, or have required large increases or
decreases in the allocation of resources to a particular area. These kinds of
policy alternatives, Schultze contends, are most in need of explicit expert
study.
13. See Charles Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy, (The Free Press, 1965).
14. Williams, op. cit.
15. However, Williams points out that observations of the policy analysis process
in government since 1965 indicate that attempts toward greater rationality,
though occurring in agonizingly slow steps, have had a substantial, positive
impact on decision-making.
16. See Walter Williams, Congress, Budgetmaking, and Policy Analysis: A Critique
After the Fiscal Year 1976 Budget Trial Run, Public Policy Paper No. 9,
Institute of Governmental Research, (University of Washington, February, 1976).
17. Ibid.
18. See the Holtzman context and testimony in this journal.
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